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CUSTODY AND PARENTING
BY PERSONS OTHER THAN BIOLOGICAL PARENTS:
WHEN NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILY LAW COLLIDES WITH
THE CONSTITUTION
GARY A. DEBELE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Most family law attorneys study constitutional law at some time during
their law school careers, but then promptly place those concepts in the back
recesses of their minds once they begin practicing family law. Constitutional issues have long been a rarity in the family law attorney’s practice.
That may be changing, and if it is not changing, perhaps it should.
One dynamic area of family law practice where constitutional matters
are often of critical importance involves disputes between a biological
parent of a child and non-parent or entity seeking a parenting role as to that
child. The most common context for these issues is third party custody or
access disputes where some third party—often a relative, foster parent, or
stepparent—seeks either custody or parenting time with a child. Another
frequent situation is where an adoption is contemplated and one or both
biological parents take issue with the adoption plan. As a result, the rights
of the biological parents conflict with the rights of the adoptive parents.
Constitutional issues arise in the area of child protection, where it is often
the state that seeks to either permanently or temporarily remove children
from the care and custody of a biological parent. Such conflicting rights
may also arise in the burgeoning area of assisted reproduction, where
children are being born with no genetic or biological ties to their legally
recognized parents.
Attorneys representing non-biological parents or entities are often
surprised that the law is biased toward the biological parent.1 Those attorneys may be further surprised or even alarmed to discover that the constitutional protections that are afforded to the biological parent may even trump
the hoary notion of the best interests of the child. It is clear beyond dispute
*
Gary A. Debele is a shareholder and president of the Minneapolis-based law firm of
Walling, Berg & Debele, P.A. He practices exclusively in the areas of family law, juvenile law,
and adoption law in state, federal, tribal, and administrative tribunals. He received his B.A. from
St. Olaf College and a J.D. and M.A. (American Legal and Constitutional History) from the
University of Minnesota.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000).
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that significant deference and protection is accorded the biological parent,
and that deference and protection flows directly from basic concepts found
in the United States Constitution, which have been applied and interpreted
so as to accord near sacred status to the right of biological parents to direct
the upbringing of their children without excessive interference by other
third parties or the state.2 To the extent the lawyer representing nonparental clients or entities wishes to challenge that notion, it will be time for
the family law attorney to reclaim constitutional law as an area of expertise
and closely consider these fundamental constitutional protections as they
exist in family law, and as practiced in the twenty-first century in the
United States.3
These notions of the constitutional rights of biological parents are not,
however, unanimously accepted nor universally and consistently applied.
Nowhere is that better illustrated than in the case of Troxel v. Granville,4
the latest decision of the United State Supreme Court addressing the rights
of a biological parent in a family law dispute.5 In that case, the parents of
two young children had never been married.6 When the biological father
committed suicide, the paternal grandparents, who had a close and loving
relationship with their two granddaughters, petitioned a trial court in the
state of Washington for an order allowing them overnight access two weekends per month and on holidays.7 The mother wanted access limited to one
day per month and holidays, with no overnight visits.8 The trial court,
applying a best interest of the child analysis as required by the state statute,
ordered access that was less than the grandparents wanted, but more than
the mother wanted.9 When the case reached the Washington Supreme
Court, that court struck down the statute as unconstitutional on its face as a
violation of the mother’s substantive due process rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the

2. Id.
3. See Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional
History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64 (1963) (challenging historians to develop and apply constitutional
history as an area of research and writing, and to not completely cede work in the area to political
scientists and law professors). The notion of this being a time for family law attorneys to
“reclaim” constitutional law as part of their cases and practices stems from this seminal article,
written by the author’s graduate school advisor, the late Paul L. Murphy, who was a long-time
member of the University of Minnesota History Department.
4. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
5. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 60-61.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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statute did not give sufficient deference to the mother’s right to raise her
children as she saw fit.10
When the United States Supreme Court weighed in, the conflicted
positions of that Court highlighted the unsettled nature of these constitutional issues flowing from the rights of biological parents to control the
upbringing of their children. Justice O’Connor authored the tenuous plurality decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer
joined. The Court affirmed the Washington Supreme Court and elaborated
on the fundamental due process rights of biological parents to raise their
children without undue interference by the courts, the state, and other
persons, and further determined that a best interest analysis alone was
insufficient to protect the fundamental rights of biological parents.11
Justice Souter concurred with the result of the plurality decision, but
said the plurality went too deep into the “treacherous field of substantive
due process,”12 and the plurality need not have elaborated on those fundamental rights. Justice Thomas also concurred with the plurality outcome,
but said the plurality should have gone even further and explicitly stated
that the strict scrutiny standard applied when reviewing these fundamental
rights.13 Justice Thomas stated that he could scarcely imagine any legitimate government interest or compelling interest that would ever justify a
court overriding a parent’s decision as to who would have contact with his
or her children and the nature of that contact.14
Three justices offered separate dissenting opinions in Troxel, revealing
very clearly the unsettled nature of these constitutional issues in family
law.15 Not surprisingly, original intent jurist Justice Scalia questioned the
soundness of the entire line of cases giving biological parents constitutionally protected due process rights to direct the upbringing of their children,
and chastised his fellow justices for interpreting “unenumerated rights.”16
He considered such parental rights to be inalienable and obvious rights
discussed in the Declaration of Independence, but not found in the Constitution.17 He expressed his fear that this case could usher in a new, unwanted

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 65-75.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 80-102. The dissenters were Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy.
Id. at 91-93.
Id.
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federal regime of family laws and principles, instead of leaving those issues
in the state legislatures where they belonged.18
Justice Stevens’ dissent questioned whether certiorari should have been
granted in the first place, but since it had, he would have reversed the
Washington Supreme Court and remanded the matter back for further
proceedings focusing on the rights of the children.19 He believed that
biology ought not be controlling, and that a better approach would be to
more equitably balance the interests of parents, children, and interested
third parties, taking into account the myriad numbers of current family
systems and relationships in contemporary society.20 Justice Kennedy’s
dissent also advocated for remand, finding that the Washington Supreme
Court’s constitutional analysis was deeply flawed in its conclusion that the
Constitution forbids the application of the best interests of the child
standard in any visitation proceeding.21 Again, the sheer variance among
the nine justices reviewing this issue suggests a constitutional analysis that
is hardly settled.
These types of situations, with their inherent constitutional issues, are
becoming more common in the typical family law practice due to the
dramatic changes occurring within the very makeup of families in our
present society, as well as the growing frequency of situations where a
biological parent is unable or unwilling to parent a child.22 It should also be

18. Id.
19. Id. at 80-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 88-91.
21. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 63-64, 90, 98. All of the justices who authored major opinions in the Troxel
decision noted these important changing demographics:
The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to
household . . . many other children are raised in single-parent households. . . . Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family are
called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing.
In many cases, grandparents play an important role.
Id. at 63-64. Justice Stevens noted: “The almost infinite variety of family relationships that
pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a
constitutional rule that treats a biological parent’s liberty interest in the care and supervision of her
child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily.” Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy stated:
My principal concern is that the holding seems to proceed from the assumption that
the parent or parents who resist visitation have always been the child’s primary
caregivers and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and
established relationship with the child. That idea in turn, appears influenced by the
concept that the conventional nuclear family ought to establish the visitation standard
for every domestic relations case. As we all know, this is simply not the structure or
prevailing condition in many households. For many boys and girls a traditional family
with two or even one permanent and caring parent is simply not the reality of their
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noted that these changing demographics of family and parenting are taking
place in the context of a swirling national debate as to the definition of
marriage, whether it is limited only to a man and woman, and whether
same-sex couples should be allowed to adopt or have custody of children.
Indeed, there is no escaping the fact that fundamental changes have been
happening to the institution of the family for several decades, and that this
has implications for the family law practitioner.23
One can pick up a newspaper, review discussions on the internet, or
simply visit an elementary classroom these days to see that the nature of the
family is dramatically changing.24 No longer are families limited to situations where a man is married to a woman and the only disputes as to
custody and visitation arise in a divorce where custody and access is litigated in family court. Now, single parents quite commonly raise children,
gay and lesbian parents adopt or have children through assisted reproduction, and many relatives, stepparents and foster parents have children in
their care and custody.25 Adopted children have long had a presence in
American society, but with fewer Caucasian domestic children available for
adoption, it has become increasingly common for children born in foreign
countries or adopted through the child welfare system to be of a race or
ethnic heritage different from their adoptive parents.26 There are also
children who have been born of donated eggs, sperm, and embryos, who
may be unaware that they are genetically or biologically unrelated to their
legal parents.27
The context of these demographic changes to the family and related
developments is significantly driven by the historical developments of the
family, historical notions of childhood and parenting, the concept that
children have rights and interests separate and apart from their parents, and
childhood. This may be so whether their childhood has been marked by tragedy or
filled with considerable happiness and fulfillment.
Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
23. As a family law practitioner for 20 years and the father of a grade-school age child, this
author witnesses the following changes on a nearly daily basis: children in schools have same sex
parents, children are being raised by grandparents or other relatives, same sex clients who are
building families through assisted reproduction and talking about going to other states or countries
to get married, and clients want information on adopting children from other countries or specialneeds children in foster care.
24. Id.
25. According to Resolution 384 passed by the United States Senate on November 15, 2007,
on that date there were approximately 514,000 children in the foster care system in the United
States, with approximately 115,000 of them waiting for families to adopt them. S. Res. 384, 110th
Cong. (2007). Justice O’Connor cited statistics of similar import in the Troxel decision regarding
the numbers of children living with persons other than parents in 1996. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
26. Supra note 24.
27. Id.
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the changes in these concepts over the years. In the early years of this
country, situations where a biological parent could not parent his or her
child were resolved informally through family arrangements, local community charities, and social service networks.28 Now they are more commonly
resolved in courts of law. The unique nature of the American legal culture
has played a significant role in these developments. It will be important to
understand this history as well as this legal culture in assessing nontraditional family law issues and constitutional issues that come into play.
While the historical and legal context is important, the seminal issues
in these types of cases remain the same: What is the best placement for the
child? What rights are at stake for the various holders who have an interest
in the placement of the child? What role should the state have in regulating
or intervening in these matters? What role should the three branches of
government have in these matters? Who ultimately should get to decide
where a child is placed and what would be in that child’s best interest? The
Constitution significantly impacts the answers to these questions when
placement is to be with someone other than a biological parent, as constitutional law addresses the priority to be given to the rights of the stakeholders
(i.e., parent, child, and the state or court) in these disputes, and how the
litigation addressing the resolution of these disputes will be structured.29
This article shall begin by identifying the types of cases where the
issues of custody and parenting by non-biological parents arise.30 This will
then be followed by a detailed discussion of the historical context in which
these disputes have arisen.31 This will include a historical look at the concept of the family, the concept of childhood, and the impact of the so-called
“children’s rights” movement. We will then take a look at the culture of
legal rights and adversarial litigation in these matters, as well as the
constitutional jurisprudence that affects these cases.32 The article will end
with analyses of where we are in handling these cases and what the family
law practitioner can do to address the best interests and placement of the
child in the face of the strong constitutional preference favoring biological
parents.33 The best approach, in the opinion of this author, rests in
elevating the interests of the child and any long-standing caregivers who
have or will love and nurture the child, while at the same time maintaining a

28. See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:
A HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 30-46, 63-81 (1994).
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part V.
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healthy, although not absolute, respect for the interests and rights of the
biological parent.
II. TYPES OF FAMILY LAW CASES WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES ARISE
There are several typical types of cases involving family law matters
where the issues of constitutional law, the rights of biological parents, and
the rights of third parties who wish to parent arise. This list is not exhaustive, but these are the most common.
A. DELEGATIONS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY, ESTATE PLANNING
TOOLS, AND STANDBY CUSTODIANS
Most states have informal and voluntary procedures, often completely
extra-judicial in nature, which allow a biological parent to place a child
temporarily in the care and custody of another person. Minnesota, for
example, has a statute that, like a statutory short-form power of attorney,
allows for a delegation of parental authority whereby a parent can temporarily place a child with another person, giving that person the authority to
make basic parenting decisions on behalf of the child, such as medical care
and school enrollment.34 Another extra-judicial action is for parents of
children to have guardianship and conservatorship provisions inserted in
their wills so as to designate a caregiver upon the death of the parents. 35
The actual appointment of such a guardian, however, needs to be provided
for by a court order, which in Minnesota would be entered in a probate
court proceeding.36
Minnesota law also provides for something called a “standby
custodian.”37 Here, the statute provides that a parent may designate a
person to care for their child in the event the parent becomes incapacitated.38 The powers are temporary in nature, the form must be in writing
and witnessed, and may be approved by the court.39 Notice must be given
to the other parent and the delegation may be revoked at any time by the
designating parent.40 The document does not take away any of the designating parent’s parental rights.41 The designation is usually used in the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

MINN. STAT. § 524.5-211 (2003).
See, e.g., id. §§ 524.5-211 (covering all areas of child protection).
Id. § 524.5-202(e); see infra notes 53-54.
See MINN. STAT. §§ 257B.01-257B.10 (2000).
Id. § 257B.01(12).
Id. § 257B.04.
Id. § 257B.05(2).
Id. § 257B.02.

1234

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1227

situation of temporary illness of the parent, to provide for a future
caregiver.42
These types of placements are typically voluntary in nature, are somewhat informal, and do not require the involvement or intervention of the
state or the courts. Thus, they do not raise significant constitutional issues.
Nevertheless, they are valuable tools available to the family law practitioner
in dealing with situations where a biological parent, for whatever reason,
cannot parent his or her child on a temporary basis.
B. THIRD PARTY CUSTODY
Third party custody actions involve more formalities and typically
extensive use of the judicial system.43 Here, a biological parent may either
voluntarily or involuntarily have their child placed with another third party,
usually on permanent basis. In this situation, while the biological parents’
rights are not terminated, many of those rights are placed with some other
person and remain in effect and binding unless there is an agreement by all
parties that leads to a court order modifying the prior order, or a court order
is entered following a judicial proceeding that modifies the prior custody
arrangement.44 These types of cases, because of the significant procedural
requirements and the potentially significant powers of a court in actually
taking some parental rights away from a biological parent, do raise significant constitutional implications that will be discussed further below. This is
perhaps the most common situation where a family law attorney will
encounter constitutional issues in his or her practice.
C. FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS
Foster care placements typically involve significant activity and intervention by state agencies and courts. These cases and situations involve a
temporary or permanent removal of a child from the care and custody of a
biological parent. There are significant constitutional and procedural protections in place, usually spelled out in detailed child protection statutes and
comprehensive procedural rules for the courts that address child protection

42. Id. § 257B.01(12).
43. Most states have their own third party custody statutes. In Minnesota, it is found in
Chapter 257C. This statute also contains provisions for third party visitation, which were cited
with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70
(2000). Like most statutes, the Minnesota statute spells out in great detail who may petition for
third party custody and visitation, how and where the petition is filed, the best interest factors that
are to be considered, the powers of the custodian, how modifications are to occur, and other such
provisions. See MINN. STAT. § 251C (2003) (covering third party custody).
44. MINN. STAT. § 257B.06(6) (2000).
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matters.45 In many states, as in Minnesota, the parents may be eligible for
court-appointed legal representation, and the children may have their own
attorney representing them.46 The courts also often appoint a guardian ad
litem to investigate and advocate for the best interests of the child. 47
Frequently the state, through its local child protection bureau, is a party to
the proceeding, represented by a local governmental attorney. Often, foster
parents and relatives can be made parties to these proceedings as well. 48
These cases raise enormous issues as to the power and authority of the state,
especially with regard to the executive branch and its child protection
office, as well as the judicial branch of government, which actually orders
and supervises any out-of-home placement of the child.49 The legislative
branch is also heavily involved, as it sets out the statutory basis for maltreatment investigations, determinations, and the nature and permanency of
any out-of-home placements that occur.50 Foster parents, who often assume
the daily care, custody, and placement of the child who cannot return to his
or her parents, are heavily regulated by state administrative authorities,
including licensing and training requirements and periodic inspections by
the local social service entity.51 As with third party custody, the constitutional ramifications in these cases are quite significant.
D. GUARDIANSHIP
Guardianship is typically a placement that occurs in a probate court
setting where there has been a death of the biological parent or parents.52
These types of proceedings raise constitutional issues in the sense that the
court and the state are once again stepping in to make a court-ordered placement of a child with someone other than a biological parent. If the parent
had planned his or her estate, the probate court does nothing more than
ratify a deceased parent’s intentions. If there is no estate planning in place,
usually family members approach the probate court with a guardianship
45. See, e.g., id. §§ 260C.001-.446; MINN R. JUV. PROTECTION PROC. 1.02.
46. MINN. R. JUV. PROTECTION PROC. 25.01.
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.325 (1999). As opposed to an attorney appointed to
represent a child, whose role is to advocate the desires of the child, the guardian ad litem is an
expert appointed by the court whose role is to investigate the needs and best interests of a child or
incompetent adult and make recommendations to the court as to how it would be best to protect or
advance those best interests.
48. See, e.g., MINN. R. JUV. PROTECTION PROC. 22, 23.
49. See generally MINN. STAT. § 260C (laying out the powers of the juvenile court in child
protection matters).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., MINN R. JUV. PROTECTION PROC. 37 (setting forth the foster parent
regulations).
52. See MINN. STAT. § 524.5-201 (2003).
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petition, or a state human services agency will step in and the state assumes
the role of guardian. Regardless of how the matter gets before the court,
there are strict notice requirements to any interested family members,
fiduciary obligations for the appointed guardian, and periodic judicial
reviews.53
E.

ADOPTION

Adoption is the most permanent of all the placement options where a
child is placed with a person who is not a biological parent. Adoption
results in a permanent and complete severance of parental rights of a
biological parent and the creation of a new legally recognized parent-child
relationship by operation of law.54 Significant constitutional issues may
exist in an adoption, including issues of notice to a biological parent that an
adoption plan is being contemplated. A biological parent is entitled to
notice of the adoption, and a question will arise as to whether a biological
parent voluntarily consents to an adoption, whether the statutory procedures
have been properly followed, and whether consent has been voluntarily and
knowingly obtained from the biological parent.55 If the biological parent’s
rights are terminated by a court rather than consent to the adoption being
executed, significant constitutional protections exist for the biological
parent.56 If the child being adopted is Native American, the intricate and
complex federal statute known as the Indian Child Welfare Act will apply.57
This Act has its own unique notice and procedural requirements that may
elevate an Indian tribe to party status in the proceeding.58 Constitutional
issues are also implicated by the widespread existence of birth fathers’
adoption registries, which set forth procedures for notice to birth fathers
who notify the state of their desire to be notified of any adoption proceeding
involving their children.59

53. Id.
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 259.35 (2007).
55. See, e.g., id. §§ 259.24, 259.49.
56. See, e.g., id. § 260C.307; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2007). The Indian Child Welfare Act also applies in child protection
situations when a child is placed with an entity or person who is not a biological parent. Readers
should also be aware that many states have their own “mini ICWA” statutes that impose similar
notice and procedural requirements under state law that also must be complied with in child
protection and adoption cases involving children of Native American ancestry. See MINN.
STAT.§§ 260.751-260.835 (2007) (laying out Minnesota’s Indian Family Preservation Act).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2007).
59. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2007).
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ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

Assisted reproduction is the newest and perhaps least understood of all
of these various child custody and placement actions that raise potential
constitutional issues. With an assisted reproduction matter, a child may be
born using genetic material (i.e., eggs, sperm, or embryos) that is implanted
into an unrelated gestational carrier, who then gives birth to a child, who
will then be placed with the intended parents.60 In other less complex
situations, intended parents may just use donor eggs or sperm and the
intended mother delivers the child, or only donor sperm is used. In many of
these cases, pre- or post-birth parentage proceedings are commenced, or
there may need to be an adoption if the intended parents are not genetically
related to the child and a gestational carrier is used. Contract law and the
creative use of statutes and other family court procedures are often used to
establish legal parentage with the intended parents.61
There are significant constitutional issues that arise in these cases in
terms of the right to contract, the rights of a gestational carrier to terminate
such a pregnancy, the amount of control that is to be asserted by intended
parents over a gestational carrier or donor of genetic material, medical
regulations dealing with the disposition of genetic materials, and the issue
of who legally possesses the embryos and related genetic materials that go
into making embryos.62 The science and technology in this area is years
ahead of the legal frameworks used to regulate this area of the law.63 Both
courts and legislatures are struggling to keep up with these new, and often
controversial, developments.
G. PARENTING TIME
There are also situations, involving disputes between biological parents
and persons who are not parents, which do not involve the actual placement
of a child. In such situations persons who may or may not be biologically
related to the child are seeking to have access and parenting time with the
child. Most frequently this arises in the context of grandparents or other

60. See, e.g., In re Paternity and Custody of Baby Boy A, No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448,
passim (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007); see infra notes 276-78.
61. Id. at *3-7.
62. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595-601 (Tenn. 1992). Davis involved a
dispute between divorcing parents as to who would be granted possession and use of their frozen
embryos. Id.
63. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2007) (setting forth Minnesota’s artificial insemination
statute). Many states have very few laws directly addressing the assisted reproduction area, and
often the few laws on the books are hopelessly out of date and not particularly helpful in this area
of the law.
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relatives seeking visitation rights with their grandchildren or related
children over the objection of a biological parent. There are also growing
numbers of stepparents who desire to have ongoing parenting time with a
step child following a divorce or legal separation from that child’s parent.
Perhaps the most difficult situations involve gay and lesbian couples who
have parented children together, split up, and want to have ongoing access
with those children. These cases are complicated by the inability of same
sex couples to be married in most states or the widespread restrictions on
their ability to adopt children together, resulting in one of the parents
having no legally recognized relationship to the child. These third party
visitation disputes generate complex constitutional issues as to the rights
such persons have to contact and visit children over the objection of the
legally recognized parent.64
III. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT65
The constitutional issues underlying these non-traditional family law
disputes have been significantly affected by historic changes to the very
concepts of childhood, the family, and the placement of children when their
parents either could not or would not parent them.66 There has also been a
burgeoning children’s rights movement over the last several decades that has
sought to dramatically change the legal status of children within our society
and bring order and consistency to a fragmented children’s rights jurisprudence.67 It is helpful to consider these historical trends when analyzing the
constitutional dimensions of placement disputes between biological parents,
individuals, and entities who are not the legally recognized parents of a child.
A. THE HISTORY OF CUSTODY AND CHILDHOOD
The legal treatment of custody and the notions of childhood have
evolved over the years.68 This history is important when considering
64. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257C (2007). Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion in
Troxel listed all of the state statutes then in existence, and as a result of that seminal case, many of
those statutes have been challenged on constitutional grounds and substantially revised. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73-74 (2000).
65. For this author’s previously published historical analysis on this issue, see Gary A.
Debele, A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests Standard, 15 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 75, 79-95 (1998) [hereinafter Debele]; Wright S. Walling &
Gary A. Debele, Private CHIPS Petitions in Minnesota: The Historical and Contemporary
Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781, 783802 (1994).
66. See MASON, supra note 28.
67. See infra part C.2.
68. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND
THE LAW (2004); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
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constitutional issues that arise in placement and access disputes in contexts
ranging from third party custody, to adoption, to permanency planning for
abused and neglected children who have been removed from their families.
During the colonial period, children were viewed primarily as important
economic producers and as little adults who were expected to work hard
and contribute to the support of the entire family; they were generally
considered property “owned” by their fathers or their guardians rather than
as young, fragile beings to be nurtured and loved.69 When colonial courts
became involved in the placement of a child, it was usually when they were
asked to enforce contracts for indentures or to resolve conflicts regarding
child labor; the notion of having custody so as to provide the child with
love, nurture, and emotional attachment was many decades away.70 “Colonial mothers had no legal right to their children when the husband/father
was alive, and only restricted rights upon his death.”71 During this period,
“divorce was an unusual event.”72
From 1790 to 1890, there was a shift from father’s common law rights
to custody and control of their children toward an emphasis on the need to
“nurture, care for, and love the child.”73 The “best interests” of the child
notion first emerged during this period.74 At the same time as these
changes were occurring, “slavery was abolished and indentured servitude
for children was increasingly frowned upon.”75 “The changing status of
women, [including] their acquisition of greater property rights and the
elevation of their position within the family as primary nurturer of the child,
led to the emergence of the ‘tender years doctrine’ that favored placing

NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA passim (1985); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: A HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES
passim (1994); RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY passim (1988); LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: A HISTORY OF THE MAKING
AND BREAKING OF MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1530–1987 passim (1990). For a general discussion
of the history of childhood and the family, see also PHILIP ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE passim (Robert Baldick trans., 1962); JOHN DEMOS, PAST,
PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY passim
(1986); JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1790 TO PRESENT
passim (1977); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN passim (1985).
69. In Troxel, the concern that current constitutional jurisprudence still treats children as
mere chattel by elevating the rights of biological parents, was forcefully articulated by Justice
Stevens. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This allegation was
vigorously responded to by Justice O’Connor in her plurality decision. Id. at 64-65.
70. MASON, supra note 28, at xii-xiii.
71. Debele, supra note 65, at 81; MASON, supra note 28, at xiii.
72. Debele, supra note 65, at 81; MASON, supra note 28, at xiii.
73. Debele, supra note 65, at 81.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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children in the care and custody of their mothers.”76 Such trends would
significantly impact the notion of a parent’s relationship to a child being
near sacred and off limits from state or third party intrusion.
During the Progressive Era at the end of the nineteenth and beginning
of the twentieth century, the state began to more actively regulate the care,
custody, and control of children.77 “Legislation was enacted that insisted
upon compulsory education and strict controls on child labor, the first
juvenile courts were created, and new standards emerged to evaluate parental competence and prevent child abuse and neglect”; this was the era when
the state and county social workers furthered the concept of child protection
under the supervision of juvenile courts and governmental boards.78
Parents who violated these laws could have their children taken from
them.79 During this time, the state could consider providing services to
poor mothers so as to correct their shortcomings as parents, rather than
having relatives, churches or local charities step in and simply remove the
children from the offending parent.80 “All of these developments in the
Progressive Era led to the creation of the modern child welfare system.”81
“While states during the Progressive Era were increasing their involvement in the regulation and intervention in families,” the notion of “individual family and parental autonomy was being reaffirmed at the national
level. It was during the 1920s that the United States Supreme Court began
to apply the United States Constitution to family autonomy matters”—what
Justice Scalia refers to in his Troxel dissent as “unenumerated parental
rights.”82 In Meyer v. Nebraska,83 the Supreme Court included the right to
marry, establish a home, and bring up children as the individual parent saw
fit within its definition of constitutionally protected liberty interests.84 In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,85 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fundamental and constitutionally protected interest held by parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.86 In
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. MASON, supra note 28, at 100-108.
80. Id. at 92-100.
81. Debele, supra note 65, at 81.
82. Id. at 82; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of the
Troxel plurality decision, Justice Scalia opined that “[t]he sheer diversity of today’s opinions
persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases [Meyer,
Pierce and Yoder] has small claim to stare decisis protection.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92.
83. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
84. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
85. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
86. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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Prince v. Massachusetts,87 the Supreme Court said that it was cardinal that
the custody, care, and nurture of the child—which the state can neither
supply nor hinder—“resides first with the parents.”88
While parental rights received strong constitutional protection in the
early decades of the twentieth century, and while those protections had
enormous staying power, there was also a growing view that the powers of
the parents were limited, and that certain basic standards to protect the
emerging view that children were fragile and dependent gained strength at
the same time. The state began to take a more active role in monitoring
standards of parental conduct, with county child protection agencies and
juvenile courts removing children from their parents’ care and custody and
placing them in foster care.89
These often contradictory trends also existed in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,90 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the power of parents may be limited if it appeared that
parental decisions would endanger the safety or health of their child, or
have a potential for social burdens.91 Other cases upheld stringent limitations on the state’s ability to intervene in family affairs.92 Even in cases
where the child was harmed or neglected, “the United States Supreme Court
determined that the Constitution calls for a balance to be struck by requiring
states in cases of child neglect to prove by the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard the need for the termination of parental rights.”93
Beginning in the 1970s, dramatic changes in custody law sharply
reversed what had been a long-entrenched preference for mothers in
custody disputes, a development that would also have important ramifications for cases where children were placed with persons or entities other
than biological parents.94 Most states adopted laws conferring an equal
status on the custodial rights of mother and father, with a favorable attitude

87. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
88. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
89. MASON, supra note 28, at xiii–xiv.
90. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-36.
92. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parent’s claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of society.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and raise one’s children have been deemed
essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . and rights far more precious than property rights.”);
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (invalidating a Wisconsin law that compelled Amish children to attend
school, because the strong state interest in compulsory schooling of children failed when balanced
against parents’ rights to direct their children’s religious upbringing).
93. Debele, supra note 65, at 81; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 751 (1982).
94. MASON, supra note 28, at 123-29.
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towards joint custody.95 This issue has been discussed at length in a
previous article that I authored, entitled A Children’s Rights Approach to
Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests Standard.96 The text approaches
the history of family and custody as follows:
The state took a more active role in monitoring standards of
parental conduct, frequently intervening to take temporary and permanent custody.97 The state also began supporting an ever-growing population of single parents, allowing them to maintain
custody of their children.98 New reproductive technology, separating conception and childbearing, challenged the ingenuity of
lawmakers and courts.99 Such trends clearly supported views that
persons other than biological mothers could effectively parent
children.
As part of these modern developments, there would be an increased reliance in custody disputes on social and behavioral
scientists to provide guidelines for what constitutes the “best
interests” of the child. Increasingly by the 1970’s, expert witnesses—especially psychologists—began to be called upon to
evaluate the relationship between the parent and the child.100 With
this shift from a father’s preference to a mother’s preference, and
then to the multi-faceted, social-scientific best interest standard for
custody decisions, came a new emphasis on joint custody, and in
cases between biological parents and non-parents, the possibility
of deemphasizing the biological connection and looking instead to
the particular and individual needs of the child.101
As with the history of custody and placement, a brief consideration of
the history of childhood also illuminates further the complex nature of the
issues involved in placement disputes between a biological parent and a

95. Id. at 129-32. California led the way in custody initiatives, as it had in no-fault divorce,
by introducing a preference for joint custody in 1980. By 1988, thirty-six states had followed its
lead. Id. at 130.
96. Debele, supra note 65, at 83-86.
97. MASON, supra note 28, at 149-56.
98. Id. at 144-49.
99. Id. at xii.
100. Id. at 167-78. As Mason notes, the psychological authorities most frequently cited by
courts were law professor Joseph Goldstein, child analyst Anna Freud, and psychiatrist Albert
Solnit, who wrote a book in 1973 called Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, which created the
concept of the “psychological parent”: the one individual, not necessarily the biological parent,
with whom the child was most closely attached. Id. at 168. In their opinion, this person should
have custody or placement of the child. Id.
101. Id.
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non-parent individual or entity. The history of childhood is also outlined in
A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests
Standard:
In his discussion of the history of childhood in America, Joseph
Kett traces changes occurring during the tumultuous eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.102 During the colonial era and early
years of the nation, there was little demarcation between childhood
and adulthood.103 Early in their lives, children began working and
extended formal education was unusual.104 This trend continued
as young people were increasingly uprooted from agriculture and
moved to urban areas where they worked in factories.105 Accompanying this development was more variety in the types of labor
young people did, as well as a trend toward increasing disorderliness and even violence in youth oriented educational and social
institutions.106 While the dependency of childhood was of shorter
duration than in modern times, semi-dependency lasted longer.107
Youth were generally seen as reckless and few institutions then
existed which marked passage from childhood to adulthood.108
This limited notion of childhood supported a law of custody
favoring fathers’ rights to the labors of their children.109
While the environment of young people prior to 1840 was likely to
have been casual and unstructured, it became increasingly patterned and regulated as the century wore on.110 The changes began
with an increase in the number of public schools with their emphasis on supervision, training, order and formation of character. 111
Evangelical protestants were especially active in the growing
institutional and intellectual concerns with the welfare of young
people.112 Also important were the changes occurring in the social
position of women, rendering the feminine influence more

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

KETT, supra note 68, at 11-85.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1244

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1227

pervasive and important in the nurturing of children.113 An
increasingly widespread romantic notion developed that the period
of childhood was a time fraught with peril and danger requiring
increasing parental and societal control.114 By the last decades of
the nineteenth century, industrialization required more schooling if
children were to advance economically.115 Declining birth rates
created a kind of family in which self-conscious nurture rather
than remote government of children was possible and indeed vital
to the industrial society.116 Middle class values of self-restraint
and self-denial thus were asserted in an extreme form, and conscious efforts were made by parents, clergy, educators, and social
workers to enforce the obedience and dependency of children. 117
This, of course, led to the rise of the “tender years” doctrine discussed above which favored mothers when custody disputes arose.
During the Progressive Era children came to be seen not only as
the victims of American society, but also as its saviors. Salvation
from current social problems seemed to lie in the innocence of
children and their amenability to education.118 Social order and
national greatness were thought to depend on their care and protection, a concept unheard of in earlier centuries.119 During this critical period of history from 1880 to 1920, these dramatic changes
occurring in the American family and in the concept of childhood
impacted developments in family law.120 While the notion of a
period of childhood innocence first took root in the Enlightenment
in Europe in the seventeenth century, it reached its peak in the
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century.121 Child
labor laws, universal education, and the juvenile justice system all
emphasized as never before the ways children differed from adults,
thereby requiring necessary differences in treatment.122

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.; see also ZELIZER, supra note 68.
MASON, supra note 28; GROSSBERG, supra note 68; DEMOS, supra note 68; DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC (1971); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
119. Kett, supra note 68, at 111-87.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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According to noted social critic Neil Postman, the period between
1850 and 1950 represented the high water mark of the concept of
the child.123 In America, successful attempts were made during
these years to get all children into school and out of factories, into
their own clothing, their own furniture, their own literature, their
own games, their own social world.124 In hundreds of laws, children were classified as “qualitatively different from adults;” in
hundreds of customs they were assigned a preferred status and
offered protection from the upheaval and uncertainty of adult
life.125 This was the period during which the stereotype of the
modern family was cast, and it was the period in which the parents
were expected to develop a full measure of empathy, tenderness,
and responsibility toward their children.126 By the turn of the century, childhood had come to be regarded as every person’s
birthright and an ideal that transcended social and economic
class.127
Postman explains in his study of the disappearance of childhood
how a new and revolutionary media has caused the expulsion of
childhood from its venerated position as discussed above.128 This
is evidenced in the merging of tastes and styles of children and
adults, as well as the changing perspectives of relevant social institutions such as the law, the schools, and sports.129 Additional evidence of this disappearance of childhood is found in the earlier onset of alcohol consumption, drug use, sexual activity, and serious
crime, all of which, according to Postman, implies a fading distinction between childhood and adulthood.130 With these trends,
some states even began dismantling the juvenile justice system. 131
In education, the school often came to be viewed as a workplace:
recess has been eliminated; school children everywhere are tested
like laboratory rats; the education debate is relentlessly framed in
terms of international competition and training future workers; and
123. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 67 (1994). For further discussion of Postman’s theories, see Peter Applebone, No Room for Children in a World of Little
Adults, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at Section 4. See also Debele, supra note 65, at 85-86.
124. POSTMAN, supra note 123, at 67.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 120.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 134.
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the high stakes race for college admission is now preceded by the
high stakes race for preschool admission.132
Up until the 1960’s media images paid homage to the notion of
childhood innocence. This has given way to increasingly sexualized images of ever younger childlike models and ads for various
products.133 In some ways this blurring between childhood and
adult has become inevitable, a function of changes in biology,
communications and society.134 Because of better nutrition and
health care, children grow up faster. As they grow up physically
faster, children are exposed to the world at an ever accelerated
pace.135 Also, as women have increasingly left the home for work,
the gatekeeper of the separation between adulthood and childhood
is increasingly unavailable to play that role.136
This disappearance of romantic notions of childhood and children,
when coupled with a view of custody decisions based on social scientific
best interests criteria without a preference for either the mother or father (or
even a biological parent) has significant meaning to this discussion of the
rights of biological parents in custody and placement disputes involving
their children. It clearly supports a notion of children as separately protected participants apart from their biological parents with their own
interests and rights. Such rights must be considered separate and independent of the biological connection to parents.
B. THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT
While approaches to custody and the concept of childhood change, and
as notions of individual (i.e. parental) rights and individual autonomy
continue to be central to our culture, the children’s rights movement has
emerged.137 A review of the history of this movement is helpful to this
analysis of constitutional issues in non-traditional family law disputes
involving the placement of children with persons and entities other than
biological parents.
According to law professor Martha Minow, in the 1970s many lawyers,
scholars, and activists began a “children’s liberation” movement, arguing

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267,
passim (1995) (providing the best overview of this movement).
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that questions of children’s competence should be decided on a case-bycase basis and that children deserved rights to participate fully in society.138
Another group of lawyers, scholars, and activists argued at the same time
that instead of simply liberating young persons from the constraints of
childhood status, the emphasis should be upon providing protections, services, and adequate care for children.139 “Whether liberationists or protectionists . . . growing numbers of advocates for children in the 1960s and
1970s found that the language of ‘rights’ offered a way to argue for both
more protection and more independence for [a variety of] children.”140
Minow refers to this concept as the “rhetoric of children’s rights.” It
began with the discussion moving from notions of children’s needs to
children’s rights.141 This rhetoric of rights was not only used to attempt to
place children in the same legal positions as adults, but also to seek special
protections.142 These developments in the 1960s and 1970s were a dramatic
departure from the previous view of children as property of parents subject
to parental and institutional authority beyond state review.143 With the rise
of the counter-culture and various liberation movements in the 1960s, such
authorities came to be increasingly questioned and deemed untrustworthy.144 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court “began to recognize
children as distinct individuals deserving a direct relationship with the state
under a legal regime protecting liberties against public and private
authorities.”145
A brief review of the Supreme Court’s treatment of children’s rights is
instructive. Until the 1960s, most Supreme Court cases involving children
adjudicated conflicts between parents and the state. As discussed above, in
1923, Meyer v. Nebraska146 established a fundamental right of parental
authority, declaring that the right of parents to “establish a home and bring
up children,” including the control of their education, is protected by the
138. Id. at 269-70.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 273. This switch was from a parent’s moral obligation to provide his or her child
with education, shelter, food, and clothes, to a notion that children had legally enforceable rights
for which they could petition. Id. at 273-75.
142. Id.
143. This author has previously written about the due process revolution as affecting children
in the 1960s and 1970s in the area of juvenile delinquency, finding this trend followed logically
from the due process revolution for blacks and women that started with the seminal decision of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Gary A. Debele, The Due Process Revolution
and the Juvenile Court: The Matter of Race in the Historical Evolution of a Doctrine, 5 LAW &
INEQUALITY 513, 518 (1988).
144. Minow, supra note 137, at 273-75.
145. Id. at 277.
146. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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Liberty (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.147 The
Supreme Court reinforced this principle in Prince v. Massachusetts,148
when it announced that “the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents.”
In discussing the issue of parental authority, I again refer to A
Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests
Standard.149 In my article, I cite Susan Gluck Mezey, who also analyzes
parental authority:150
According to law professor Susan Gluck Mezey, with few exceptions, in cases of conflict between parent and state the Court has
held fast to this principle.151 The Supreme Court’s adherence to
the doctrine of parental authority was grounded in cases in which
it was assumed that a harmony of interests existed between parent
and child; when the interests of the parent and child diverged, the
Court was forced to reconcile the principle of parental authority
with the child’s constitutional rights.152
The rhetorical principles guiding the Supreme Court in these cases
have been that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone,”153 and that “[c]onstitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority.”154 In reaching its decisions, the
Supreme Court was forced to balance these principles against the
state’s responsibility for the education, moral development, and in
some cases, rehabilitation, training, and punishment, of the
child.155
Mezey observed that not only does an analysis of Supreme Court
decisions affecting children’s rights demonstrate decreasing support for
children’s rights claims, the cases also demonstrate a great deal of inconsistency in the way the Supreme Court has handled children’s rights cases: 156

147. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
148. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
149. Debele, supra note 65, at 90.
150. Id. at 90-93.
151. Susan Gluck Mezey, Constitutional Adjudication of Children’s Rights Claims in the
United States Supreme Court, 1953 to 1992, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307, 309 (1993).
152. Id.
153. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
154. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
155. Mezey, supra note 151, at 309.
156. Id. at 309-10.
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Mezey cites as examples that the Supreme Court accorded adult
status to children in situations such as death penalty sentencing,
but not in abortion rights.157 The Supreme Court was willing to
override state policy by favoring children who are disadvantaged
by their parents’ marital status, yet unwilling to do so for children
who were disadvantaged by their parents’ economic status.158
Over the years, the Supreme Court appears to have assigned a
lower priority to the children’s interest than to the competing
interests of the state and family.159 Consequently, as the cases
demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s rulings often yield contradictory
results: at times, applying adult principles of law to children, other
times not; at times extending children’s autonomy, other times not;
at times protecting children from a hostile world, other times not.
Moreover, the rationales for the decisions in these cases are often
elusive.160
This trend is certainly seen in Troxel and offers hope to family law
practitioners seeking to reduce the power of the biological connection in
placement, custody, and access disputes between parents and third parties.
According to Mezey, the Supreme Court’s rulings lie in traditional
principles of constitutional law and “appear to be motivated more by the
jurisprudence of the constitutional claim than by adherence to a child welfare theory.”161 The Supreme Court has looked at children’s rights issues in
a variety of contexts. The Court has considered criminal proceedings,162
illegitimacy issues,163 rights of children in the schools,164 rights to

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 321.
161. Id. at 321-22.
162. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (death penalty); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1984) (pretrial detention); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16 (1982) (death penalty); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (double jeopardy in
juvenile court adjudicatory hearings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (jury
trial for juveniles); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (standard of proof in juvenile courts);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (right to counsel); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-54
(1966) (waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court).
163. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988); Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-56
(1986); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982);
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977);
Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (equal
protection issues in an illegitimacy case).
164. See, e.g., Kadramas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 465 (1988) (payment of
school bussing fees); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (student
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abortion,165 and child protection and commitment issues.166 The Supreme
Court “cases show that despite the urging of children’s rights scholars and
advocates, the Court has not arrived at a coherent theory to guide the
outcome of cases brought by or on behalf of children.”167 Troxel certainly
supports that observation.168
As a result of these trends, a legal ambivalence came into the children’s
rights movement over the last several decades. Faced with repeated efforts
by advocates to extend constitutional rights to children, as is apparent in the
above review of cases, in the 1970s the Supreme Court began balancing two
starkly contrasting alternatives: extending adult rights to children, or simply
treating “children in important ways as subject to different authorities,
institutions, and relationships than adults.”169 According to Minow, a third
position emerged in the 1970s stressing traditional authority and warning
“against the conflicts and disorder that rights for children would
engender.”170 Such rights, these critics claimed, “would inject conflict and
individualism into the sphere of family life and disturb the usual
arrangements for caring for children.”171 This view presumably supports
and strengthens the biological connection, elevating the power and control
of biological parents.
newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (lewd speech in high
school); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 (1984) (searches in high school); Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (school residency requirements); Bd. of Educ. v. McCluskey,
458 U.S. 966, 971 (1982) (school suspension); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982)
(removing books from school library); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (tuition for
undocumented aliens); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 (1977) (corporal punishment in
schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (school suspension without hearing); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973) (school financing); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (compulsory education for Amish); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind.
Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (protests in school).
165. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (parental consent
for abortion); Guile v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (parental
consent for abortion); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (parental consent for
abortion); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983) (parental
consent for abortion); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983)
(parental consent for abortion); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411-13 (1981) (parental consent
for abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979), (parental consent for abortion);
Carey v. Population Serv. Int., 431 U.S. 678, 697-99 (1977) (contraception); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (parental consent for abortion).
166. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 203
(1989) (state’s duty to protect a child); Sec’y of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442
U.S. 640, 649-50 (1979) (procedure for voluntary commitment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
620 (1979) (procedure for voluntary commitment).
167. Mezey, supra note 151, at 322.
168. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80-101 (demonstrating a multitude of opinions
and approaches to the issue).
169. Minow, supra note 137, at 277.
170. Id. at 281.
171. Id. at 284.
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According to Minow, by the 1980s, “the movement for children’s
rights had failed to secure a coherent political or intellectual foundation, not
to mention a viable constituency with political clout.”172 Into this framework entered Robert Mnookin who captured the patchwork of judicial
decisions governing children’s legal status by stating three distinct
themes.173 First, he argued “that parents have primary responsibility to
raise children”; second, “the state has special responsibilities for children to
intervene and protect them”; and third, “that children as people have rights
of their own and have rights as individuals in relation to the family and in
relation to the state.”174 According to Minow, these themes are constantly
in conflict.175 Troxel, with its myriad views and positions on these issues,
shows that we still have not reached consensus on fundamental constitutional issues affecting the placement of children with third parties and
access by third parties to these children.
According to Minow, four reasons exist for the historic failure of
children’s initiatives.176 These include first, that “children do not vote, and
no other lobby has appeared on their behalf.”177 Second, America has
experienced cycles of child welfare reform and disillusion; the reforms of
one generation, become the problems to be reformed by a later generation,
with the early reforms and subsequent problems cautioning against further
reform.178 Third, children’s needs are connected to larger intractable issues,
such as economic problems, women in the work force without adequate
child care, negative views of poor parents, failures of public education,
abortion, and crime control.179 Fourth, our culture and ideology “produce
great resistance to state intervention in families[,] a resistance articulated by
both the political left and right,” and as a result, we treat other people’s
children as beyond public concern.180
Minow considers a final option, based on international human rights
for children, that remains to be significantly explored.181 The human rights
argument seeks to treat children not as candidates for children’s rights or

172. Id. at 287.
173. See Glenn Collins, Debate Over Rights of Children Is Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1981 at A1 (quoting Professor Robert Mnookin, professor of law at University of California at
Berkeley).
174. Id.
175. Minow, supra note 137 at 287.
176. Id. at 295.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 296.
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child protection, nor as adults with rights, but simply as human beings with
certain basic human rights.182 Under this approach to children’s rights, as
human beings children deserve the rights of dignity, respect, and freedom
from arbitrary treatment. Dignity, respect, and freedom do not displace or
undermine parents, but instead reminds parents and other adults of their
fundamental responsibilities towards children.183
This excursion through the history of childhood and custody, and
review of theory and Supreme Court case law regarding children’s rights, is
instructive in our present examination of constitutional issues in nontraditional family law disputes involving the placement of children with
persons who are not biological parents. If nothing else, this analysis indicates that we are now at a place where we need to shift the focus away from
the near supreme and unassailable right of biological parents to possess and
control their children, no matter what the deficiencies in parenting, to a
higher concern of really determining what is best for the child. This view
has been articulated somewhat by the dissents of Justices Stevens and
Kennedy in Troxel.184 In this author’s views, the notion that biology trumps
all else is not supported by historical or jurisprudential trends. To find a
better approach, a close analysis of the uniquely American approach of
addressing the legal aspects of family law disputes and constitutional law is
necessary.
IV. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
One of the aspects of the way American society resolves these types of
family disputes is the significant role of the courts and litigation. At the
heart of this approach is the fundamental notion, enshrined in our Constitution, that individual American citizens enjoy the substantive due process
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. One category of such
cherished individual rights is the right of biological parents to control and
direct the upbringing of their children, with limited state and judicial interference or claims by persons who are not biological parents. Indeed, Justice
Scalia, who does not find such a right specifically discussed in the Constitution, does find it to be among the category of “inalienable rights” mentioned
in the Declaration of Independence, which states “all men are endowed by
their Creator.”185 When we discuss in this article the rights of biological

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80-91, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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parents to raise their children without undue interference by the state or
other persons, it is this constellation of rights that can be asserted and
protected in courts of law, a view that is uniquely American and at the heart
of these disputes involving the family and the Constitution.
A. THE AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE
One cannot ignore the uniquely American emphasis on individual
rights that each American citizen deems to be his or her birth rights. One of
the central theses of this article is that children also have individual rights
that must be elevated and protected in custody and placement disputes. At
least a passing discussion of this uniquely American notion of individual
rights is necessary to fully comprehend and ultimately accept the view that
biological parentage should not be determinative in child placement disputes between biological parents and other persons and entities. Justice
Kennedy in his Troxel dissent highlights the significant role that litigation
can play in these complex family disputes involving third parties and the
Constitution.186
According to political scientist Stuart A. Scheingold, there has long
been a tradition of American beliefs accepted as mainstream, taught in our
schools, and advanced throughout society emphasizing individualism,
private property, the market economy, and limited government.187 While
there may be differences between the major political parties in this country
as to how these values are emphasized and used in society, there does tend
to be a widespread belief that private property, in whatever form, is

186. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy observed as follows:
It must be recognized, of course, that a domestic relations proceeding in and of itself
can constitute state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship
that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations
for the child’s welfare becomes implicated. The best interests of the child standard
has at times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results. If a
single parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with visitation demands from a
third party, the attorney’s fees alone might destroy her hopes and plans for the child’s
future. Our system must confront more often the reality that litigation can itself be so
disruptive that constitutional protection may be required; and I do not discount the
possibility that in some instances the best interests of the child standard may provide
insufficient protection to the parent-child relationship. We owe it to the Nation’s
domestic relations legal structure, however, to proceed with caution.
Id.
187. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 18-20 (1974). For an outsider’s observation of America’s unique fixation on
rights and litigation, see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1959). For classic
historical studies of these uniquely American characteristics, see LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE
REVOLUTION (1955); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE
MEN WHO MADE IT (1955).
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identified as the secret of individual achievement and satisfaction, the
individual with a stake in the existing system is the cornerstone of stable
government, there is a widespread distrust of the power of the state, and the
purpose of politics is to serve needs defined from a personal prospective.188
In short, there is a widespread and fundamental notion at work through all
classes and regions of the country that the integrity of the individual is
embodied in the idea of equality before the law and protected against governmental intrusion in a variety of ways spelled out in provisions of the Bill
of Rights.189 The perception is pervasive that individual rights in American
culture are asserted, and indeed protected, in our burgeoning judicial system. Americans talk freely, openly and frequently about their rights regardless of the nature or level of the dispute. Family law disputes, like any
other, are played out in our culture as a battle of competing rights which, if
they cannot be worked out between the parties by themselves without
judicial or other state involvement, end up in the judicial system for
resolution.190
Despite this extreme American focus on individual rights, liberties, and
the frequent use of litigation to protect such rights and interests, there has
also been a historical reluctance to extend these rights to certain less powerful segments of society. This has included blacks, women, gays and lesbians, and of course, children. As an example of this cultural refusal to
recognize children’s rights, an interesting article addressing probate and
inheritance issues notes that the United States, nearly alone among modern
nations, allows parents to disinherit their children.191 Although the author,
Ronald Chester, acknowledges a number of reasons for this situation, he
believes an explanation of this phenomenon most likely lies in the extreme
tolerance for individual control over property in American culture, even
after death. Clearly, these entrenched notions of individualism and rights
are important concepts, given our nation’s early approach to custody and
childhood.192
While no one outwardly considers children to be property anymore,
neither children nor the family appears to be held in high enough esteem to
overcome this cultural desire for individual control.193 Chester notes:
“Americans exhibit a strain of individualism that often takes on an anti-

188. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 187, at 18-20.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Ronald Chester, Should American Children be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 406 (1997).
192. Id. at 406-07.
193. Id. at 407.
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government slant.”194 In other words, “many Americans would not want an
organ of the state, including a court, to have broad discretion over the disposition of their property.”195 The same notions exist in family related
matters. As a result, thewidespread American beliefs in parental autonomy
for parents and children make family protection more difficult to realize.196
This is certainly true in family court disputes where courts must decide between disputing biological parents and other interested persons and entities
where a child must be placed.
In this time of international terrorism by fundamentalist religious zealots, we hear much talk about the importance of the rule of law. According
to political scientist Richard Kagan in his seminal study of the American
legal system, the concept of the rule of law is generally viewed as a positive
thing, and when “compared to other economically advanced democracies,
American civic life is more deeply pervaded by legal conflict and by controversy about legal processes.”197 The United States “relies on lawyers,
legal threats, and legal contestation in implementing public policies, compensating accident victims, striving to hold governmental officials accountable, and resolving business disputes.”198 “Attorneys are more detailed,
complicated, and prescriptive [than they are in other countries]. . . .
American methods of litigating and adjudicating legal disputes are more
costly and adversarial.”199 Kagan refers to this uniquely American method
of policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means
of lawyer-dominated litigation as “adversarial legalism.”200
According to Kagan, “adversarial legalism can be distinguished from
other methods of governance and dispute resolution that rely instead on
bureaucratic administration, or on discretionary judgment by experts or political authorities, or on the judge-dominated style of litigation common in
most other countries.201 While the United States often employs these other
methods too, it relies on adversarial legalism far more than other economically advanced democracies.”202 Kagan believes this has both its positive
and negative effects.203 This system is especially open to new kinds of
194.
195.
196.
197.
(2001).
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 436.
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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justice claims and political movements.204 American courts are particularly
flexible and creative.205 This adversarial system of judges and lawyers
serves as a powerful check on official arbitrariness and provides a protection of essential individual rights.206 The very nature of this unique system,
while often bemoaned as a big part of the tendency to over-litigate family
law disputes, ironically gives hope for a more child-focused approach to
cases involving custody on placement with someone or something other
than the biological parent.
The negatives highlighted by Kagan include a system that is markedly
inefficient, complex, costly, punitive, and unpredictable as a method of
governance and dispute resolution.207 Complexity, fearsomeness, and
unpredictability of its processes often deter the assertion of meritorious
legal clams, and compel the compromise of meritorious defenses.208 They
often inspire legal defensiveness and contentiousness, which impede socially constructive cooperation.209 Yet, in this author’s opinion, we have
not come up with another system in which the protection of individual
rights is better protected.
Kagan, like Scheingold, believes that adversarial legalism is deeply
rooted in the political institutions and values of the United States.210 While
many family law attorneys believe these disputes would be better resolved
in venues other than courts of law, “we must also recognize that Americans
are not likely to accept wholesale replacement of legal rights and practices
by legal institutions drawn from rather different political traditions.”211 As
Kagan states, “[f]or good and for ill, adversarial legalism is the American
way of law, and it is likely to remain so.”212 According to Kagan, American adversarial legalism is best viewed not merely as a method of solving
legal disputes, but as a mode of governance embedded in the legal culture
and political structure of the United States.213
The United States has by far the world’s largest group of “special cause
lawyers” seeking to influence public policy and institutional practices by
means of innovative litigation.214 This is certainly true in the family law
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
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arena as well, with attorneys specializing in advocating for fathers, for
domestic abuse victims, and in the current context, for grandparents and
foster parents. In no other country are lawyers so entrepreneurial in seeking
out new kinds of business, so eager to challenge authority, or so quick to
propose new legal theories.215 The United States has a remarkable propensity to stage highly publicized knock-down-drag-out legal donnybrooks,
such as the custody battle over the six-year-old Cuban refugee Elian
Gonzales, made-for-television adoption disputes such as the Baby Richard,
Baby Jessica, and Baby M cases, and dramas about who gets to end the life
of a wife and daughter in a permanent vegetative state—the very types of
cases that inject huge televised doses of politicized legal argument into the
nation’s everyday experience.216
Kagan comments briefly on his notions of adversarial legalism when
applied to American family law. He finds legal unpredictability pervades
this area, in which judges, not juries, decide alimony, child custody, and
marital property distribution disputes, with lawyers and the public having
difficulty discerning court standards and being unable to predict outcomes
of court processes.217 Especially in family matters, because of their sheer
numbers and emotionally challenging situations, many judges pressure the
parties and lawyers to settle cases before trial, further adding to legal uncertainty.218 Again, in an area of law such as family law, where there are complex constitutional issues in play and very little consensus even from the
United States Supreme Court, family law practitioners should accept both
the challenges and opportunities that our judicial system presents to us and
not hesitate to construct constitutional arguments that will best serve our
clients and the children involved.
B. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The unique approach to protecting individual rights and interests through
litigation has also been played out in important ways through the constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. As noted at the outset of
this article, most family law practitioners seldom consider constitutional laws
and concepts in their cases. This is at least partially the result of the reality
that until recently, most of their disputes involved divorces between a husband
and wife or custody and support issues in a paternity dispute between a biological mother and biological father. There is also the widely accepted axiom that

215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 7-9.
See id.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
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the United States Supreme Court has traditionally left family law disputes to
the realm of state courts and state legislatures.219 However, there are a number
of significant United States Supreme Court cases involving family court
actions, most notably when family members’ fundamental notions of procedural due process were being infringed upon,220 or parents’ claimed fundamental constitutional rights to raise and parent their children were being
denied.221 The legal centerpiece for these family law disputes before the
Supreme Court was the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “no state
shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]’”222 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the
219. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (holding that there is no
federal diversity jurisdiction for domestic relations actions); Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (stating that matters involving competing and multifaceted social and
policy decisions are best left to local decision making); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431
(1984) (“The judgment of a state court determining or reviewing a child custody decision is not
ordinarily a likely candidate for review by this Court.”). In the year 2001, a family law
practitioner wrote an article in the magazine of the ABA’s Family Law Section which listed fiftythree cases in all of Supreme Court jurisprudence through that year that addressed a family law
issue. Supreme Court Cases, 22 FAM. ADVOC. 15-17 (2001).
220. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (noting that, in a child
support case, visits to a state are insufficient “minimum contacts” to give a state long-arm
jurisdiction); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that Texas law could not
exclude nonmarital children from a generally enforceable right to parental support); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971) (holding that the state’s interest in collecting filing fees
was insufficient to justify denying court access to indigents seeking a divorce); Cook v. Cook, 342
U.S. 126, 128 (1951) (stating that the effect of a divorce decree extends to new state); Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587-89 (1951) (holding that the effects of a migratory decree extends
to third parties such as children); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213 (1948) (holding that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply when divorce is ex parte).
221. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (upholding the traditional
presumption of legitimacy that applies to a child born to a married mother and refusing to allow
non-spousal father any right to assert paternity or custody); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456. 463-64
(1988) (striking down a six-year statute of limitations for paternity action); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that courts may not consider race as the sole factor in determining
the best interests of the child in a custody dispute); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93
(1983) (finding de facto relationship where party lived with the children for years, contributed to
their support, and saw them frequently after separation; party allowed to block the children’s
adoption by their mother’s new husband); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (to
terminate parental rights, the state must meet a clear and convincing standard of proof); Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1981) (due process does not require
counsel for indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceeding); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 267-68 (1981) (the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
biological protection when the parent has not demonstrated a commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978) (unmarried father can not have
veto power over an adoption when he had never legitimized, lived, nor supported the child); Smith
v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (there is no liberty
interest requiring due process hearings before a child is removed from a foster home.); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (father is entitled to a fitness hearing before his children are
taken away and made wards of the state); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.545, 551-52 (1965)
(stepparent’s adoption reversed due to denial of the divorced biological father’s procedural due
process right to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Amendment’s due process clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart,
“guarantees more than fair process.”223 The clause also includes a substantive
component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”224 The liberty
interest at issue in disputes between a biological parent and other person or
entity seeking placement or access is the interest of the parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children, noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Troxel as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.”225
More than 75 years ago in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Unites States Supreme
Court held that the “liberty” protected by the due process clause includes the
rights of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control
the education of their own.”226 Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
the United States Supreme Court again held that “liberty of parents and
guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”227 The Supreme Court explained in Pierce that
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”228 The Supreme Court returned to
that subject in Prince v. Massachusetts and again confirmed that there was a
constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children.229 The Court stated that it is cardinal that “the custody, care, and
nurture of a child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither supply nor
hinder.”230
In subsequent cases, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.231 This extensive precedent clearly indicates that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children. This line of cases leaves no doubt that parents have a

223. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
224. Id. at 720. See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
225. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
226. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399, 401 (1923).
227. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
228. Id. at 535.
229. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
230. Id. at 166.
231. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding their children, and a
corresponding privacy interest, absent exceptional circumstances, in doing so
without the undue interference of strangers to them and to their child.
Moreover, these cases have explained that with this constitutional liberty
comes a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the natural bonds of
affection leave parents to act in the best interests of their children.232
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s repeated recognition of these
significant parental liberty interests, these interests have never been considered
to be without limits. This is where persons and entities who are not biological
parents enter with their requests for custody or access rights. In Lehr v.
Robertson,233 for example, the Supreme Court held that a putative biological
father who had never established an actual relationship with his child did not
have a constitutional right to notice of his child’s adoption by the man who
had married the child’s mother.234 Of critical importance in the disputes between biological parents and other third parties or entities is the notion coming
out of Lehr that a parent’s liberty interests “do not spring full blown from the
biological connection between parent and child; they require relationships that
are more enduring.”235 Also significant to the issue at hand, in Michael H. v.
Gerald D.,236 the United States Supreme Court concluded that despite both
biological parenthood and an established relationship with a young child, a
father’s due process liberty interest in maintaining some connection with that
child was not sufficiently powerful to overcome a state statutory presumption
that the husband of the child’s mother was the child’s parent.237 As a result of
that presumption, the biological father could be denied even visitation with the
child because, as a matter of law, he was not a parent.238 A plurality of the
Court in that decision recognized that the parental liberty interest was a function, not simply of isolated factors such as biology and intimate connection,
but of the broader and apparently independent interest in family.239
Under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, a parent’s rights with
respect to her child have never been regarded as absolute. Rather, such rights
are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child,

232. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 895 (1992); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
233. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
234. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
235. Id. at 260 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
236. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
237. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-27.
238. Id. at 127.
239. Id. at 123. See also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-504
(1977).
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and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family. These
limitations have arisen, not simply out of the definition of parenthood itself,
but because of the United States Supreme Court’s assumption that a parent’s
interests in a child must be balanced against the state’s long recognized interests as parens patriae, and critically, the child’s own complementary interest
in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and protection.240
As Justice Stevens cogently stated in his dissent in Troxel, the United
States Supreme Court “has not yet had the occasion to elucidate the nature of a
child’s liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like
bonds,” however to him it seemed extremely likely that, “to the extent parents
and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so too do children have those interests, and so too must their
interests be balanced in the equation.”241 At a minimum, prior cases of the
United States Supreme Court recognize that children are, generally speaking,
constitutionally protected actors requiring rejection of any suggestion that
when it comes to parental rights, children are simply chattel.242 According to
Justice Stevens, the constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended so as to prevent the states
from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority
that is not in fact motivated by interest in the welfare of the child.243 This
could easily include denying interested third parties and entities access rights
or custody where appropriate.
As shall be discussed in greater detail below, there certainly is United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence to support third party requests for custody, placement, and parental access. Troxel has created no small amount of
confusion, emboldening parental rights advocates who seek to challenge third
party requests for access and custody.244 Interestingly enough, Troxel,

240. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760,
766 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944).
241. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000). The Supreme Court has, on numerous
occasions, acknowledged that children are in many circumstances possessed of constitutionally
protected rights and liberties. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 600 (finding a liberty interest in avoiding
involuntary confinement); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the constitution and
possess constitutional rights.”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 50607 (1969) (upholding a First Amendment right to political speech); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967) (advocating due process rights in criminal proceedings).
242. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 2002) (biological father relied on Troxel to challenge the award of custody of his daughter to her maternal
aunt and uncle).
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authored by Justice O’Connor, speaks positively of several states’ third party
visitation statutes then in place.245 It does not specifically address any third
party custody statutes. The United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in this
area, starting at the beginning of the twentieth century, mirrors the historical
developments going on across the nation with regard to the history of the
family and childhood, the children’s rights movement, and third party custody
and access issues. Anyone representing third parties or persons and entities
who are not biological parents in any of these types of disputes needs to be
cognizant of the positive constitutional arguments that can be raised both in
support of, and in opposition to, the requested relief.
C. MINNESOTA JURISPRUDENCE
Of course, the United States Supreme Court is not the only judicial entity
that considers constitutional claims in addressing custody and access disputes
between biological parents and third parties. As this author is a licensed
Minnesota practitioner, he is most aware of the law in that state. He assumes,
however, that other states in the nation have taken similar paths in the
development of their jurisprudence in this area, and that a discussion of
Minnesota law would be instructive to practitioners in other states.
In considering historical developments in Minnesota, the trend in this
state’s case law has similarly mirrored developments across the country. Until
relatively recently, third party access and custody was a creature largely of the
common law. Statutes that existed and were applicable often did not fit the
disputes between biological parents and non-parents well. An understanding
of these case law developments was especially critical before both third party
custody and access were codified. However, even now with elaborate statutes
in place, these cases can be quite complex and factually unique; the analysis
offered by Minnesota’s appellate courts, including the interplay between
constitutional rights and statutory and case law provisions, is often critical to
obtaining the relief sought.
In Minnesota, there has long been a bold commitment to the use of the
best interests of the child standard by appellate courts addressing the
placement and custody of children in a variety of legal contexts. The
Minnesota Supreme Court early on “overrode a statutory mandate that fathers
receive custody and awarded custody to a mother due to her role as the
primary caretaker.”246 The preference was “absolute for some trial judges.”247

245. Troxel, 530 U.S. 69-71.
246. Gary L. Crippen & Sheila M. Stuhlman, Minnesota’s Alternatives to Primary Caretaker
Placement: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 677, 679 (2001) (citing
Flint v. Flint, 65 N.W. 272, 273 (Minn. 1895)).
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The legislature long deferred to the judiciary in custody and access disputes,
and indeed the first legislative reaction to the Court’s strong preference for
mothers did not come until 1969 when the Minnesota Legislature directed the
courts to place no weight on the sex of the parent in determining custody.248 It
was not until 1974 that the legislature revised the statute to detail specific
factors for the courts to consider when determining a custodial placement.249
A multi-factor best interest test has been at the heart of Minnesota custody,
placement, and access disputes ever since.
In its developing jurisprudence following these statutory multi-factor
enactments, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that the trial courts must
make findings of fact on all of those factors that are brought into dispute
because detailed findings facilitate judicial review and unmask hidden biases
in decision making. Similarly, in subsequent cases, the Minnesota Supreme
Court suggested an interest in protecting primary caretaking mothers from
judges inclined to arbitrarily overlook the interest of the child in being with the
child’s mother.250
The primary caretaker factor has been significant in third party custody,
placement, and access issues. Many third party claimants rest their claims to
access or custody on the existence of a long and nurturing relationship with a
child. Hence, it is critical to focus on the judicial and legislative treatment of
that factor. In Minnesota, a judicial recognition of the interest served by the
primary caretaker placement culminated with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Pikula v. Pikula,251 with the court declaring that children should be
placed with their primary parent.252 The supreme court had hoped that
preference would reduce litigation and provide more predictable results in
recognition of the tension between giving the trial courts discretion to make
individualized decisions in the interest of justice while providing predictable
decision making.253
According to retired Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Gary L. Crippen
in his recent study of the primary caretaker factor, the Pikula presumption
favoring primary caretakers produced a backlash that badly diminished the
strength of these caretakers’ cases for sole custody and placement. Four years
after Pikula, the legislature amended the list of best interests factors by adding

247. Id. at 679.
248. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1969).
249. MINN. STAT. § 518.17(1) (1974).
250. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976); Bernt v. Bernt, 292
N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980); Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Minn. 1983)
251. 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985)
252. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
253. Crippen & Stuhlman, supra note 246, at 679-80.
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a statement that prohibited the court from using “one factor to the exclusion of
all others.”254 While this change occurred because fathers contended that
Pikula caused the courts to unduly confine their consideration of statutory best
interest factors and thus deprive fathers of success in their efforts to obtain
child custody, the change had ramifications for best interest considerations in
grandparent custody and access disputes. The amendment further required the
courts to make detailed findings on all of the best interest factors. When
reflecting on the best interest factors, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Maxfield v. Maxfield255 stated that primary caretaking is “the golden thread
running through any best interest analysis” because it bears on all other
factors.256 In response, the legislature further clarified its intent, amending the
statute once again to declare that “the primary caretaker factor may not be
used as a presumption in determining the best interests of the child.”257 While
third parties in their custody and access disputes with biological parents also
had other factors to emphasize, the requirement of a true, multi-factored
consideration also applied to them.
This trend in making custody and placement determinations open to a
broad and complete best interests analysis occurred at the same that Minnesota
reaffirmed a strong preference for placements with relatives when biological
parents were unfit or had abandoned the child. In the seminal case for relative
placement preferences in the state of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in In the Matter of the Welfare of M.M.258 stated that it has long been a
familial phenomenon that the absence, inability, or incapacity of the natural
parents to provide and care for their children has prompted other relatives to
step forward to assume the benefits and responsibilities of that role.259 While
at one time judicial intervention was unnecessary, a body of common law developed according a custodial preference to near relatives.260 The Minnesota
Supreme Court in M.M. stated that there remains a strong preference to award
the permanent care and custody of a child to a relative if either or both of the
natural parents are unable to perform that responsibility.261 In fact, according
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, on examination of the cumulative legislation
addressing the many aspects of child custody concerns, it becomes clear that
the legislature has strongly endorsed the societal goal of strengthening and

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (supp. 1989).
452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990).
Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 223.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990).
452 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1990).
M.M., 452 N.W.2d at 241.
Waldron v. Bienek, 193 N.W. 452, 452-53 (Minn. 1923).
M.M., 452 N.W.2d at 238 (citing MINN. STAT. § 257.02 (1980)).
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preserving the biological family structure.262 M.M. also takes the maxim of
Maxfield, referring to the golden thread running through any best interests
analysis stating that a bond between a child and a “primary parent” should not
be disrupted without strong reasons, and assumedly equates that primary
parent bond to the bond existing between a maternal grandmother and her
grandchild.263
Indeed, Minnesota has a long line of third party custody and placement
decisions extending back to at least the turn of the twentieth century where the
courts have considered requests by third parties, some related and some not,
and has found in many of the cases that placement with them would be in the
best interests of the child.264 Minnesota case law has developed, in
262. Id. As illustrative examples, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited the following statutes
then in affect: MINN. STAT. § 256F.01 (1988); MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2)(a) (1988); but see infra
note 267 for the discussion of the Adoption and Safe Families Act. This federal statute, which
significantly redirects child protection placements away from a focus on family preservation to
permanency and efficient decision-making, has many requirements for the states and is now being
felt in juvenile court proceedings where children removed from homes are returned more quickly
or sent with relatives in transfers of custody or adopted.
263. M.M., 452 N.W.2d at 240.
264. In the Matter of the Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W. 2d 166 (Minn. 2002) (affirming a
parental preference, but indicating that the ultimate determining factor in third party custody is the
best interests of the child); Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989) (affirming award
of custody to family friend after finding child had been integrated into friend’s household with
mother’s consent and returning child to mother would result in severe regression); Wallin v.
Wallin, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Minn. 1971) (remanding for new hearing because mother had been
denied custody merely on the ground that transferring custody might be disruptive); State ex rel.
Waslie v. Waslie, 152 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. 1967) (removing child from the grandparent and
returning to the parents because family was intact and stable); In re Hohmann’s Petition, 95
N.W.2d 643, 648-49 (Minn. 1959) (affirming placement with biological father over step-father,
although children wished to stay with step-father); In re Klugman, 97 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn.
1959) (finding insufficient evidence to support committing the children to state guardianship);
State ex rel. Nelson v. Whaley, 75 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Minn. 1956) (ordering child’s return to
biological mother, after the infant was inappropriately placed with non-relatives by a physician,
without assistance of social agencies); State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, 40 N.W.2d 881, 884
(Minn. 1950) (ruling that an order to show cause in a divorce proceeding was unrelated to a
determination of custody between the father and paternal aunt); State ex rel. Merritt v. Eldred, 29
N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1947) (removing child from step-father and placing with biological father,
because although both men were deserving, there was no reason the biological father should be
denied custody); Hervey v. Hervey, 230 N.W. 479, 480 (Minn. 1930) (allowing maternal aunt and
uncle to retain custody after considering age and sex of the child, conditions in the mother’s home,
step-father’s hostility towards the child, and the suitability of the aunt and uncle’s home); State ex
rel. Larson v. Halverson, 149 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. 1914) (finding the interests of a child
suffering health problems best served by allowing the maternal grandparents to retain custody);
D.W. v. C.M. & A.K.M., 627 N.W.2d 687, passim (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing the
statutory factors found in Minn. Stat. §518.17(1)(a)); Mize v. Kendall, 621 N.W.2d 804, 810
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (placing legal and physical custody with biological father did not constitute
abuse of discretion); LaChappelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(granting biological mother sole physical custody, and granting joint legal custody with the sperm
donor); Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming that
grandparents were not entitled to an evidentiary hearing absent prima facie showing that the
child’s present care endangered her physical or emotional health, and the danger of changing
custody was outweighed by advantages of such a change); In re the Custody of N.M.O., 399
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accordance with national trends, that while biological parents clearly have a
constitutionally protected interest in raising their children, the constitutional
right is not absolute, and if the third parties can sustain the heavy burden of
showing either unfitness, abandonment, or other extraordinary circumstances,
and that placement would be in the best interests of the child, courts will allow
custody placements with grandparents and other relatives, and third parties
with significant relationships to the children.265
In the area of foster care placements and the child protection system, the
Minnesota Legislature has over the years enacted sweeping permanency
legislation that mirrors the national mandate set forth in the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 that emphasizes the need to make prompt determinations
of whether children can return to their biological parents,266 and if not, to have
a concurrent plan in place that will allow a prompt move to third party custody
with a relative or important friend, termination of parental rights followed by
adoption, or as a last resort, permanent foster care.267 This statutory scheme
has withstood numerous constitutional challenges by biological parents who
objected to their children being removed and put on the fast track to permanency.268 The balance of the rights of parents versus the need of the state
as parens patriae to protect the children from neglectful or abusive parents
and the rights of the children to have safe and nurturing childhoods has been
carefully considered.
In the area of adoption, the Minnesota Supreme Court has moved from
the era when a father was found to have an ongoing right to commence a
paternity action even after the birth mother was moving forward with an
adoption plan and the father had failed to file an affidavit with the state
indicating an intention to retain parental rights, as the state laws provided in
1996,269 to a situation where the state legislature enacted a birth father’s

N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a step-father was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the best interests factors set out in MINN. STAT. § 518.17 before the father is awarded
custody); Tubwon v. Weisberg, 394 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (granting custody to
family friend over biological mother, because biological mother was found unfit, and family
friend had established a parent-child bond with the child and performed all parental roles).
265. See MINN. STAT. § 257C (2007) (a new and comprehensive third party custody and
visitation statute that codifies the common law as to parental preferences, but sets forth the best
interest of the child factors that must also be considered, as well as the procedures that must be
followed); Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2006) (the most recent third party
custody case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
266. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012, 260C.001(3), 260C.193-.215 (2003).
267. Adoption and Safe Families Act Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
268. See, e.g., Matter of the Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 723-24 (Minn. 1998); In re
Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (Minn. 1996).
269. In the Matter of the Paternity of J.A.V., 547 N.W.2d 374, 379-80 (Minn. 1996).
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adoption registry270 that the Minnesota Supreme Court said had to be strictly
complied with if the father wished to have any say in an adoption plan
affecting his child.271 Here again, there was a careful balancing of the rights
of the biological parents to make an adoption plan or to be notified of an
adoption plan and have an opportunity to either support the plan or stop it, the
rights of the adoptive parents to proceed with an adoption without having to
worry about a biological parent emerging from obscurity to disrupt the adoption, and the rights of the child to move relatively quickly into a permanent
custodial placement and live a healthy, happy life.
In the area of assisted reproduction, the appellate courts have addressed
such circumstances on two occasions. In one, the dispute involved a lesbian
couple that had a child through artificial insemination using sperm donated by
a gay couple.272 The two women went through a second parent adoption, had
an informal contact agreement with the gay men, and when disputes arose between them, the two women split up and the man who donated sperm commenced a paternity action and had the adoption vacated.273 By the time the
case arrived at the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the matter had devolved into a
three-way custody and access dispute where the constitutional issue was
whether the biological mother, who had moved to Michigan, could be compelled to return periodically to Minnesota so the biological father and her
former partner, with whom the biological mother shared custody after the
adoption was vacated, could exercise parenting time with the child.274 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the state’s interest in protecting the
child’s best interests was compelling enough to justify intrusion into the biological mother’s privacy in her familial relationship with the child. Thus,
conditioning sole physical custody on the mother’s returning to the state from
Michigan did not violate her constitutional right of privacy or equal
protection.275
270. MINN. STAT. § 259.52 (2003). The Father’s Adoption Registry, enacted in 1997, was at
least partially a response to J.A.V., 547 N.W.2d at 380.
271. Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 369-70 (Minn. 2002). In this seminal case, the
Court interpreted the Minnesota Father’s Adoption Registry and held that the putative father, who
had not registered his interest in the child with the state within thirty days of the child’s birth, was
barred from maintaining a paternity action. Id. at 370. The allegedly fraudulent collusion to
conceal the mother’s location did not relieve him of his obligation to register, as the mother had
no fiduciary duty to disclose her location to the putative father. Id. The father’s “substantial”
compliance with the registration (he was one day late) was insufficient to preserve his right to
assert an interest in the child, and because of his failure to timely register, with which he had
complete control, he lacked a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with the child.
Id.
272. In re the Custody of L.M.K.O., 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 163-64.
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In an unpublished decision by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, an intended father used his own sperm and a donor egg and entered into an arrangement
with his niece to be his gestational carrier.276 When the carrier refused to turn
the child over to him after birth, he commenced an action in Minnesota to
enforce the terms of the gestational carrier contract.277 Both the district court
and the court of appeals, after applying traditional contract analysis, held in
favor of the intended father and awarded him full custody.278
The Minnesota Supreme Court has had the opportunity to address third
party visitation in several modern cases.279 Historically, grandparents had
virtually no legal right to maintain a relationship with a grandchild independent of the wishes of the child’s parents.280 Reluctance on the part of legislators
and courts to intervene in family relationships flowed from the notion that
parental authority, with regard to the raising of children, should be impacted
by the state as little as possible.281 However, beginning in the 1970s, states
started to address by statute the issue of grandparent visitation rights.282 In
276. In re Paternity and Custody of Baby Boy A, No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, *1-2
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).
277. Id. at *2.
278. Id. at *9.
279. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Minn. 1995); In re the Petition of Louis Santoro,
594 N.W.2d 174, 174 (Minn. 1999).
280. In re Petition of Bianca Niskanen, 223 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1974).
281. See Olson, 534 N.W.2d at 549 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
282. For a comprehensive chart of states that have third party visitation statutes for stepparents, grandparents, out-of-wedlock parents, and any interested parties, see Linda D. Elrod &
Robert G. Specter, A Review of the Year in Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM..
L.Q., 577, chart 6 (2002). For articles discussing grandparent visitation trends, see Diane L.
Abraham, California’s Step-parent Visitation Statute: For the Welfare of the Child, Or a CourtOpened Door to Legally Interfere with Parental Autonomy: Where Are the Constitutional
Safeguards?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 125 (1997); Stephen Elmo Averett,
Grandparent Visitation Rights Statutes, 13 B.Y.U. J.PUB. L. 355 (1999); Alicia Bell, Public and
Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225 (2001); Joan C. Bohl, The “Unprecedented Intrusion”: A Survey and
Analysis of Selected Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (1996); Joan Catherine
Buhl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward Awarding Visitation Only When
the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 279 (2000); Sara Elizabeth Cullen,
Legislative Reform, Troxel v. Granville and its Effect on the Future of Grandparent Visitation
Statutes, 27 J. LEGIS. 237 (2001); Tony Eddy, Grandparent Visitation Rights in Ohio When the
Family is Intact, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 197 (1999); John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale
for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998); Stephen Hellman,
The Child, the Step-parent, and the State: Step-parent Visitation and the Voice of the Child, 16
TOUR. L. REV. 45 (1999); Nicole E. Miller, The Best Interests of All Children: An Examination of
Grandparent Visitation Rights Regarding Children Born Out of Wedlock, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
179 (1998); Karen Alyssa Nellie, Whose Child is it Anyway? The Unconstitutionality of the Texas
Grandparent Visitation Statute, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 721 (1999); Meagan E. Peek, Grandparent
Visitation Statutes: Do Legislatures Know the Way to Carry the Sleigh Through the Wide and
Drifting Law?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 321 (2001); Melodies Pelletier, Grandparent Visitation Rights:
The Pitfalls and the Promise, 2 LAW’S. PUB. INT. L. 177 (2001); Erica L. Strawman, Grandparent
Visitation: The Best Interests of the Grandparent, Child, and Society, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 31
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1976, the Minnesota Legislature also jumped in to the fray by adopting a
statute now found at Minnesota Statute § 257C.08. This statute was cited with
approval by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel as having a framework
that protects the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child, and also protects the parent’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of his or her own
child.283 In its most recent third party visitation case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the application of the statute in the face of constitutional
attack.284 The statute provides that the court may award grandparent visitation
if it is in the best interests of the child and it would not significantly interfere
with any parent-child relationship.285
The Minnesota Supreme Court also recently considered that third party
visitation statute in the context of a dispute between a lesbian couple who had
lived together for many years and co-parented two children whom one of them
had adopted.286 When the couple separated, the non-adoptive parent sought
court-ordered parenting time under Minnesota’s statute allowing visitation to
unmarried persons.287 While the court affirmed that the adoptive parent had a
constitutionally protected right to the care, custody, and control of her
children, that right was not found to be absolute, and states may intrude on
parental rights in order to protect the general interest of the youth’s well
being.288 The court found the non-adoptive parent to be “in loco parentis”—
having put herself in a situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations
incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities of a
legal adoption.289 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, that
access would be in the best interest of the children and would not interfere
with the parent-child relationship, and the request for parenting time by the
non-adoptive parent was granted.290 The court went on, however, to hold that
because a provision of the non-parental visitation statute impermissibly placed
the burden on the custodial parent to prove that visitation would not interfere

(1998); Richard S. Victor, Grandparent Visitation Rights in the 21st Century, 2000 L. REV. MICH.
ST. U. DET. C. L. 793 (2000); Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy:
An Abridgment of Parent’s Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 1085 (2000);
David T. Whitehouse, Constitutional Law—Grandparent Visitation Rights: North Dakota
Declares the Grandparent Visitation Statute Unconstitutional, 76 N. D. L. REV. 191 (2000).
283. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000).
284. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 2007).
285. MINN. STAT. § 257C.08(2) (2007).
286. SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 818.
287. Id. at 818-19.
288. Id. at 821-22.
289. Id. at 823.
290. Id. at 821-23.
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with the parent-child relationship, that section was deemed unconstitutional as
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.291
Clearly, the Minnesota statutes and case law in circumstances where nonparents were seeking custody, placement, or access to children have carefully
weighed the competing interests and concerns in such disputes between
parents and non-parents. In most of these circumstances, the constitutional
rights of the parents and the strong preference for protecting biological ties has
been maintained, while the courts and legislature have found ways to carefully
consider the best interests of the child and give non-parents the ability to be
heard and to advance their positions as to why placement or contact with them
would be to the benefit of the child.
V. CONCLUSION
This analysis of constitutional issues in non-traditional family law cases
where children are placed with persons or entities other than biological parents
flows from the current demographics of the family in American society.
There are increasing numbers of children who are not living with a biological
parent, either because a parent could not or would not properly care for them.
There are also countless children who are allowed court-ordered access to
persons who are not their biological parents, but who have important relationships with children who need to be supported. Yet, the constitutional protections that accord biological parents near sacred status in the eyes of the law
remain. It is either time to change that presumption, or failing that, find ways
to creatively address and apply those presumptions to the unique factual
situations that require something other than allowing the biological connection
to drive the outcome.
Such a dramatic change in a fundamental constitutional notion is not
without precedent or support in history and American jurisprudence. As
discussed above, long held notions of the family, family structure, and childhood have changed significantly over the years. As a result, more and more
members of society are open to and exposed to various configurations of
family that did not previously exist. In the long sweep of history, we have also
seen dramatic changes in the ways custody and placement decisions are made.
For example, we no longer have legally recognized presumptions for mothers
or fathers having custody, and we no longer use orphanages, insane asylums,
and indentured servitude as placement options. Instead, custody and placement decisions are made based on professional assessments of the needs of the
child and abilities of the parents, and we have multifaceted lists of best

291. Id. at 823-24.
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interests of the child factors that draw on child development theory, advances
in mental health, and a variety of community resources. Many experts now
assist courts in making custody, placement, and access decisions.
A view that children have rights that are to be protected has seeped into
American culture, much as occurred for women, racial and ethnic minorities,
and the disabled. The author is not so naïve as to suggest that everyone is now
treated fairly or equally in American society, but there has been a groundswell
of change that has occurred since the Supreme Court first articulated the
fundamental rights of biological parents to parent their children as they saw fit.
In other areas of the law affecting the placement and custody of children,
many changes have occurred in how the law considers these issues that
certainly bode well for changes in the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding
the rights of biological parents. In the child protection arena, for example,
while the clear trend has been to give the state significant powers in its capacity as parens patriae to protect children and remove them from their parents’
care when necessary, federal legislation and growing practice at the state and
local level has been to reorient away from returning the children to their
parents as quickly as possible to making a permanency decision as quickly as
possible, with permanency options being third party custody, adoption, and
permanent foster care if the child cannot return home. That enormous change
in philosophy and direction in the child protection area has significant
ramifications for a call to move away from a near absolute preference for
placement with a biological parent over a non-parental third party.
In the adoption area, the birth father’s adoption registries blossoming
across the county have provided a very workable solution to balance the rights
of the biological parents to be heard, the adoptive parents to finalize their
adoptions with some degree of certainty and expeditiousness, and to provide
the adopted child a permanent home with minimal risk of subsequent disruption.292 In the assisted reproduction area, contract law is increasingly ordering
the system, as is judicial oversight and approval of the contracts, and reasoned
determinations of parentage.
If one considers the long jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, from the early cases of the 1920s, which elevated the rights of biological parents to near sacred status, to the paternity cases of the 1970s, which
required parents to be involved with their children if they wanted to have
protected rights, to Troxel, where the Supreme Court is shockingly fractured,
there are clear indications that the significant rights of biological parents are
not absolute. In fact, all of the justices in Troxel recognized the dramatic

292. See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355 passim (Minn. 2002).
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changes in family demographics that have occurred over those years.293 Most
hopefully, Justice Scalia questioned the soundness of the analysis underlying
the parental rights jurisprudence.294 Justice Stevens advocated a rebalancing
of rights, with a significant focus on the rights of the child;295 Justice
Kennedy highlighted the importance of the multifaceted best interests of the
child standards developed at the state and local level as the best approach in
resolving these disputes.296 Indeed, the long-standing view of triumphant
rights of biological parents may not be as strong we have long assumed.
While there certainly is much room for improvement in the ways family
courts across the land address these difficult cases, we must also be realistic
and accept that the way our American legal system operates is not going to
change overnight. We live in a litigious society. Americans value their individual rights, and will continue to frame any and all disputes that need
resolution in terms of rights and the protection of those rights. In these cases
and situations discussed in this article, that approach is going to continue, but
we must also look for positive attributes in that system. The American judicial
system allows for changes in approach and philosophy, allows litigants and
their attorneys to present the particulars of a case and the specific needs of a
child, all of which can be evaluated by trained professionals and considered by
the common sense of our judicial officers. The arguments for change in the
treatment of third parties seeking custody, placement, or access need to be
made, however, and hopefully this article will assist family law practitioners in
making those arguments.

293.
294.
295.
296.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80-101 (2000).
Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 87-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

